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Abstract— Offering real-time data security for petabytes of data is important for Cloud Computing. A recent survey on cloud 
security states that the security of users’ data has the highest priority as well as concern. We believe this can only be able to 
achieve with an approach that is systematic, adoptable and well-structured. Therefore, this paper has developed a framework 
known as Cloud Computing Adoption Framework (CCAF) which has been customized for securing cloud data. This paper 
explains the overview, rationale and components in the CCAF to protect data security. CCAF is illustrated by the system design 
based on the requirements and the implementation demonstrated by the CCAF multi-layered security. Since our Data Center 
has 10 petabytes of data, there is a huge task to provide real-time protection and quarantine. We use Business Process 
Modeling Notation (BPMN) to simulate how data is in use. The use of BPMN simulation allows us to evaluate the chosen 
security performances before actual implementation. Results show that the time to take control of security breach can take 
between 50 and 125 hours. This means that additional security is required to ensure all data is well-protected in the crucial 125 
hours. This paper has also demonstrated that CCAF multi-layered security can protect data in real-time and it has three layers 
of security: 1) firewall and access control; 2) identity management and intrusion prevention and 3) convergent encryption. To 
validate CCAF, this paper has undertaken two sets of ethical-hacking experiments involved with penetration testing with 10,000 
trojans and viruses. The CCAF multi-layered security can block 9,919 viruses and trojans which can be destroyed in seconds 
and the remaining ones can be quarantined or isolated. The experiments show although the percentage of blocking can 
decrease for continuous injection of viruses and trojans, 97.43% of them can be quarantined. Our CCAF multi-layered security 
has an average of 20% better performance than the single-layered approach which could only block 7,438 viruses and trojans. 
CCAF can be more effective when combined with BPMN simulation to evaluate security process and penetrating testing results.    
Index Terms— Cloud Computing Adoption Framework (CCAF),security framework, Business Process Modeling Notation 
(BPMN), Data security in the Data Center, multi-layered security protection. 
——————————      —————————— 
1 Introduction
LOUD Computing and its adoption has been a topic 
of discussion in the past few years. It has been an 
agenda for organizational adoption due to benefits in 
cost-savings, improvement in work efficiencies, business 
agility and quality of services [1-2]. With the rapid rise in 
Cloud Computing, software as a service (SaaS) is particu-
larly in demand, since it offers services that suit users’ 
need. For example, Health informatics can help medical 
researchers diagnose challenging diseases and cancers [3]. 
Financial analytics can ensure accurate and fast simula-
tions to be available for investors [4]. Education as a Ser-
vice improves the quality of education and delivery [5]. 
Mobile applications allow users to play online games and 
easy-to-use applications to interact with their peers. 
While more people and organizations use the Cloud ser-
vices, security and privacy become important to ensure 
that all the data they use and share are well protected. 
Some researchers assert that security should be imple-
mented before the use of any Cloud services in place [6-
8]. This makes a challenging adoption scenario for organ-
izations since security should be enforced and imple-
mented in parallel with any services. Although organiza-
tions that adopt Cloud Computing acknowledge benefits 
offered by Cloud services, challenges such as security and 
privacy remain a scrutiny for organizational adoption. 
While overseeing the importance of security, the software 
engineering and development process should always de-
sign, implement and test security features.  
The data centers have encountered challenges of rapid 
increase in the data [9-11]. For example, in a data center 
that the lead author used to work with, daily increase of 
100 terabytes of data was common. If the organization has 
encountered a rapid rise of data growth and is unable to 
respond quickly and efficiently, problems such as data 
traffic, data security and service level agreement issues 
can happen [6, 11]. In this paper, we focus on the data 
security while experiencing a large increase of data, 
weather they are from the external sources such as attack 
of viruses or trojans; or they from the internal sources if 
users or clients accumulate hundreds of terabytes of data 
per day. This is a research challenge for data security 
which is essential for the better management of the data 
center to handle a rapid increase in the data. 
Apart from the data center security management for 
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rapid growth in data, the software engineering process 
should be robust enough to withstand attacks and unau-
thorized access. The entire process can be further consoli-
dated with the development of a framework to tighten up 
the technical design and implementations, governance 
and policies associated with good practices. This moti-
vates us to develop a framework, Cloud Computing 
Adoption Framework (CCAF), to help organizations suc-
cessfully adopt and deliver any Cloud services and pro-
jects. In this paper, we demonstrate our security design, 
implementation and solution for CCAF. We use penetra-
tion testing and related experiments to validate its ro-
bustness and measure precision, recall and F-measure to 
justify advantages over other approaches. The breakdown 
of this paper is as follows. Section 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 present 
literature related to Cloud application security. Section 2 
presents security overview under CCAF. Section 3 de-
scribes CCAF security in details, including the code, mul-
ti-layered approach and component for each layer. Sec-
tion 4 explains how to protect data security and predicts 
likely consequences by using Business Process Modeling 
Notation (BPMN) simulations. Section 5 uses penetration 
testing against the CCAF multi-layered security and 
compares with other similar approaches. Section 6 pre-
sents Conclusion.  
 
1.1 Cloud applications security 
literature and overview 
We review a few selected literatures that are relevant for 
Cloud application security described as follows. Existing 
literature [7-9, 11-12] define cloud application service se-
curity as threats, vulnerabilities and protection of cloud 
operational services and software as a service applica-
tions Liu et al [7] has proposed an agent-oriented model-
ing framework for analyzing security requirements. 
However, it is perceived as yet another modeling lan-
guage than security requirements capturing framework. 
Mather et al [8] provides a detailed definition and de-
scription on various cloud security and privacy issues. 
However, there is no clear framework to follow from se-
curity requirements. Cebula and Young [12] further clas-
sify cloud applications security engineering and its im-
plementation into two major groups: software acquisi-
tion security (which includes the security specifications in 
all processes to buy, rent, or interchange software to use 
in an enterprise) and systems & software development 
security (which include the security specifications in all 
processes to develop information systems). However, 
there is no clear framework to be adopted to classify secu-
rity requirements and then to feed towards implementa-
tion. A framework with a holistic approach of offering an 
integrated solution and multi-layered security is required. 
 
1.2 Data security for the private clouds 
hosted in the Data Center  
As discussed in the introduction, the rapid data growth 
poses challenges for data security for the private clouds 
hosted in the data center. Literatures for different security 
solutions are as follows. Zhang et al [11] provide review 
of the Cloud Computing and explain the research chal-
lenges associated with security. However, they only pro-
vide an overview of important security challenges but do 
not provide a full detailed solution on Cloud security. Liu 
et al [7] explain their software security analysis with their 
rationale and an example. However, there is a lack of de-
tails about the software design and implementation pro-
cess involved, and empirical results to evaluate its per-
formance and effectiveness of their proposed solution, 
which looks like the combination of UML and workflows. 
Yu et al [13] and Wang et al [14] propose their fine-
grained security model for Cloud storage. Both are simi-
lar, except that proposal from Yu et al [14] are more in 
details and they explain theories and users associated 
with their proof-of-concept. However, both proposals [13, 
14] do not have any experiments, simulation and empiri-
cal data to prove the effectiveness and robustness of their 
fine-grained security model. Thus, both proposals do not 
address in-depth data security issues, when the rapid 
growth of data is a challenge for the Data Center. 
There are common observations in the security pro-
posed methods: Each paper [7-8, 10, 12, 14] only proposes 
a single solution. In the event of fraud, cyber criminal 
activities and unauthorized hack, the security solution is 
insufficient to protect the data security and the data cen-
ter if only a single solution is adopted. Hence, a better 
alternative is required. We proposed the multi-layered 
security to integrate security techniques to illustrate the 
essence and effectiveness of the framework with ad-
vantages of doing so. First, the strength of each technique 
is enhanced. Second, since each technique cannot always 
fully prevent hacking or provide a full solution without 
fallacy, the multi-layered security can improve the extent 
of security since it is more difficult for viruses and trojans 
to break different types of security in one go. The aim is 
to maximize security protection and reduce the threats.  
To demonstrate the data security of the private clouds 
hosted in the data center, we propose the use of ethical 
hacking to demonstrate whether our CCAF multi-layered 
security can withstand a large amount of viruses and tro-
jans attacks, if the rapid data increase is from the external 
malicious hacking. We will provide detailed process and 
results in Section 5. 
2 Security overview under cloud 
computing adoption 
framework (CCAF)  
The current challenges facing cloud community on cloud 
security is enormous. Therefore, we need a clear frame-
work, which provides an integrated approach to study 
cloud service performances before the implementation, 
the one that supports clear implementation of cloud secu-
rity attributes at the implementation level, and the one 
that can be adopted by both cloud users and cloud pro-
viders. The use of the framework is a suitable approach 
illustrated by Zhang et al. [15], who propose a user-based 
security framework for collaborative computing systems. 
They explain their rationale, background, core technolo-
gies, usage scenarios, experiments, results and their in-
terpretations. Their approach is heavily focused on the 
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use of XML to transfer and interpret data through their 
security mechanism. The use of the framework is an suit-
able approach provided with careful and clear explana-
tions. We have proposed our own framework, Cloud 
Computing Adoption Framework (CCAF), to address the 
security challenge.  
     The CCAF is a comprehensive model for adopting and 
applying cloud security principles systematically. The 
outcome of each activity is shown inside the parenthesis. 
These best practice techniques will keep grow as the 
framework has been in various applications. It is a con-
ceptual framework like ITIL version 3 to guide organiza-
tions for the best practices. Additionally, such a frame-
work can integrate with Cloud Computing services to 
provide added values for adopting organizations [16]. It 
is also an architecture framework focused on the delivery 
of a security service, in the form of developing a multi-
layered security for data centers. Zhang et al. (2008) ex-
plain their rationale, background, core technologies, us-
age scenarios, experiments, results and their interpreta-
tions. Their approach is heavily focused on the use of 
XML to transfer and interpret data through their security 
mechanism. Framework is an appropriate method pro-
vided with careful and clear explanations. This section 
presents the background work and overview for our pro-
posed Cloud Computing Adoption Framework (CCAF). 
 
2.1 Overview 
We generalize the areas for security overview. The fol-
lowing are categories of CCAF security aims to cover: 
 Application software security which deals with 
how we can build systems that can automatically 
protect themselves.  
 Network (LAN, MAN, GAN), wireless network se-
curity and platform security include Operating 
Systems, Virtualization and systems software. 
 Convergence network security where converging, 
multi-network media infrastructures, social net-
works and technologies, which is one of the emerg-
ing areas of research. 
 Service-oriented security where issues related to 
system services such as denial of service attacks, 
distributed denial of services, and web services. 
 Cloud security deals with services security, data 
security and privacy so that services delivered and 
assets are protected. 
 Open-source software security includes issues such 
as trust, certification and qualification models. 
 Software components and architecture, security 
which deals with building components and archi-
tectures with security can be used as plug-ins. 
 Web services security is essential to ensure secure 
services are delivered with integrity. 
 Systems & Software security engineering deals 
with building security in CCAF right from re-
quirements. This is also considered developing 
software applications with CCAF. 
Recommendations from McGraw [17] provide a com-
prehensive framework for systems engineering methods 
and concepts. However, it does not offer a complete solu-
tion for Cloud Computing. This motivates us to have a 
comprehensive design, implementation and service for 
Cloud security under the CCAF recommendation. CCAF 
is a framework for organizations that we have previously 
demonstrated how CCAF can be offered in healthcare 
[18], finance [19] and other types of businesses. It is our 
goal to provide guidelines and recommendation for secu-
rity and privacy. Computer security has been classified 
into a number of general concepts and processes such as 
identification, which identifies objects, functions, and ac-
tions, authentication, authorization, privacy, integrity and 
durability. We have so far well established basic security 
features with identification, authentication, authorization, 
digital security encryption and decryption techniques. 
Key features with their explanations are as follows. 
 
Identification is a basic and first process of establishing 
and distinguishing amongst person/user & admin ids, a 
program/process/another computer ids, and data con-
nections and communications. Often we use alphanumer-
ical string as user identification key and some may use 
your email as the user identification key and this can be 
checked against when a user login into the system. Au-
thentication and authorization are two distinct forms of 
access controls to access any information in the system.  
Privacy is the key to maintaining the success of cloud 
computing and its impact on sharing information for so-
cial networking and team work on a specific project. This 
can be maintained by allowing users to choose when and 
what they wish to share in addition to allowing encryp-
tion and decryption facilities when they need to protect 
specific information/data/media content. 
Integrity is the basic feature of human being as a process 
of maintaining consistency of actions, communications, 
values, methods, measures, principles, expectations, and 
outcomes. Ethical values are important for cloud service 
providers to protect integrity of cloud user’s data with 
honesty, truthfulness and accuracy at all time. In cloud 
computing terms, we can achieve integrity by maintain-
ing regular redundancy checks and digital certification in 
addition to other basic security features of maintaining 
identification, authentication, and authorization.  
Durability is also known as, persistency of user actions 
and services in use should include sessions and multiple 
sessions. 
2.2 CCAF Security Design 
This section describes the system design required by 
CCAF. Capturing and identifying requirements for secu-
rity explicitly is one of challenges in Cloud security for 
SaaS, which has an impact on the functionality of the sys-
tem. Therefore, we need to be able specify security re-
quirements explicitly throughout the security-specific life-
cycle phases as part of achieving CCAF (security re-
quirements, design for security, security testing and se-
curability testing). Tondel et al. [20] has provided an ex-
tensive survey on security requirements methods which 
help to identify security requirements systematically and 
structure them. For example, Mead [21] for the SEI’s 
(software Engineering Institute) has identified a method 
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known as SQUARE (Secure Quality Requirements Engi-
neering) which has been extended SysSQUARE (Systems 
Engineering SQUARE) towards systems security engi-
neering method. Our extended method consists of ten 
steps as follow: 
 Agree on definition to define a set of acronyms, 
definitions, and domain-specific knowledge needs 
to be agreed by stakeholders. This will help identi-
fy and validate security-specific requirements 
clearly by stakeholders. 
 Identify security goals to clearly define what is 
expected of the system with respect to security of 
business drivers, policies and procedures. 
 Develop artefacts to develop scenarios, for exam-
ples, misuse cases and templates for specifications 
and forms. 
 Perform risk assessments to conduct risk analysis 
for all security goals identified, conduct threat 
analysis. 
 Select an elicitation technique to include system-
atic identification and analysis of security require-
ments from stakeholders in the forms of interviews, 
business process modeling and simulations, prototypes, 
discussion and focus groups. As part of this phase, 
one should identify level of security, cost-benefits 
analysis, organizational culture, structure and 
style. 
 Elicit security requirements to include activities 
such as producing security requirements docu-
ment based security specific principle structure as 
part of our goal of developing CCAF earlier, risk 
assessment results, and techniques identifies for 
analysis such as business process modeling and simu-
lations, threat modeling, and misuse cases, etc. 
 Categorize security requirements to include activ-
ities that (1) classify and categorize security re-
quirements based on company-specific require-
ments specification templates and (2) use our rec-
ommended security principles as this will help 
Systems Engineers to apply CCAF and (3) track se-
curity-specific requirements to validate & verify at 
all stages of the systems engineering life-cycle. 
 Identify systems data security requirements to 
include activities on extracting and carefully iden-
tifying data security and relevant sub-systems 
such as data centers, servers, cloud VMs, and 
software security, SQL security, and other types of 
security that are relevant to the data. This separa-
tion of concerns allows systems engineers to inte-
grate, track, design, and develop data security as 
part of enterprise wide systems development. 
 Prioritize security requirements to include activi-
ties of selecting and prioritizing security require-
ments based on business goals as well as cost-
benefit analysis. 
 Inspect security requirements to conduct re-
quirements validation process using requirements 
inspection and review meetings. 
 
To achieve an integrated security for the iterated re-
quirements, one can select keywords as objects and com-
ponents. System and software components should con-
tain a CCAF multi-layered security and each layer has its 
own security focus. Details will be presented in Section 3 
and 5. 
Most of the security attributes and principles identified 
earlier are clearly applicable to developing cloud services 
with a systems engineering focus. However, there are 
some cloud-specific security related issues such as securi-
ty in virtualization and server environments. Cloud secu-
rity attributes can be found in many-fold as shown in 
Figure 1. Although there are many attributes available, 
they can be further categorized as follows: 
Confidentiality, Privacy and Trust – These are well 
known basic attributes of digital security such as authen-
tication and authorization of information as well protect-
ing privacy and trust. 
Cloud services security – This includes security on all its 
services such as SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. This is the key area 
of attention needed for achieving cloud security. 
Data security – This category is again paramount to sus-
taining cloud technology. This includes protecting and 
recovering planning for cloud data and service centers. It 
is also important to secure data in transactions. 
Physical protection of cloud assets – This category be-
longs to protecting cloud centers and its assets. 
The above cloud security attributes/characteristics are 
essential and useful to understand non-functional aspects 
of services development and service provision. These at-
tributes are also useful for building CCAF and maintain-
ing security. 
Figure 1: CCAF Cloud Security Attributes serving for 
the community 
2.3 CCAF Data security 
Data security address most of the cloud computing secu-
rity challenges either you consider architectural and tech-
nological concerns nor process and regulatory security 
challenges; all of them comes down to data in many 
forms such as information (deals with identity manage-
ment), data in transition and transaction, data in modifi-
cation, privacy of user data, and data at rest on servers 
and storages. However, the selections of a number of rec-
ommendations [7-9; 20-24] have identified about eight 
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key data security issues that are: 
• Data tampering deals with issues of unauthorized 
modification to a transaction. For example, if you 
add 100 times to a simple transaction of £/$1000.00 
this equals to £/$100K. Oracle [22] presents that 
80% of security breaches are caused by insider at-
tacks than any other forms of security attacks. 
• Eavesdropping and Data Theft deal with stealing 
critical personal data (personal and financial in-
formation such as credit card) during data trans-
mission. Network and packet sniffers can be used 
to steal such information. 
• Falsifying User Identities deals with identity theft 
by gaining access to data and can also threaten dig-
ital signatures with non-repudiation attacks 
• Password-related threats deals with stealing and 
cracking passwords. 
• Authorized access to tables, columns, and rows 
deals with security at the database level. 
• Lack of accountability deals with system adminis-
trators for monitoring and protecting data access 
and user account management. 
• Complex User Management Requirements deal 
with user account management strategies. 
• Multi-tier Systems deal with providing access to 
other services and application layers. 
• Scaling the security administration of multiple Sys-
tems poses extra complexity of managing cloud se-
curity as it deals with providing multiple accesses 
to multiple applications. 
3 CCAF data security in details  
This section describes different types of system develop-
ment and process development for CCAF. The content 
includes the code syntax to proceed with the CCAF secu-
rity, the architecture and the proposal of the multi-
layered security.  
3.1 CCAF Security Schema by XACML 
This section describes the software scheme required by 
CCAF. Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) is the language that can define the rule, permis-
sion, function and interactions in the use of SaaS and 
Cloud security. A proposed XACML section type, Rescue, 
is described here as an example. “Rescue” is used to block 
virus, trojans and attacks such as denials of services and 
unauthorized access. In the event of hacking, all the files 
are backed up and retrieved from secure ports such as 22 
for secure FTP and 443 for secure HTTPS. Instead of dis-
playing IP addresses in the traditional method, the IP 
addresses in all virtual machines are assigned at runtime.  
There is an OVF ID that handles processing of the DR 
request. The syntax is ovf:id =”rescue” presented in Table 
1. All the OVF IDs can be mapped to the required IP ad-
dresses when a VM is deployed. This allows “Rescue” to 
describe not just a single VM behavior, but expected 
communications and actions between VMs required for 
rescued actions. Another feature in Table 1 shows 
ovf:required=”true”, which means Rescue action is on. 
What triggers Rescue is when the security software de-
tects activities from unknown IPs in the list of unknown 
hosts to ensure Rescue can protect all the users in real-
time.     
   Table 1: The CCAF Security Software Schema 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 CCAF multi-layered security 
CCAF security software implementation is demonstrated 
by its multi-layers of security mechanism to maximize 
protection. It also ensures reduction in the infections by 
trojans, virus, worms and unauthorized access and denial 
of service attacks. Each layer has its own protection and is 
in charge of one or multiple duties in the protection, pre-
ventive measurement and quarantine action presented in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The CCAF multi-layered security in a nut shell 
 
All the features in CCAF multi-layered include access 
control, intrusion detection system (IDS) and intrusion 
prevention system (IPS), this fine-grained security 
<ns: Rescue ovf:required=”true” xsi:type="ovf:Rescue_Type">  
  
<Info> Rescued actions for SaaS security </Info>  
<Rule>  
    <Info> Retrieve data and put them in safety </Info>  
   <Protocol> tcp </Protocol>  
   <DstAddr ovf:id=”rescue” />  
   <DstPort> 22 </DstPort>  
   <DstPort> 443 </DstPort> 
   <SrcAddr> any </SrcAddr>  
   <SrcPort> any </SrcPort>  
 </Rule>  
  
 <Rule>  
   <Info> Destinations for quarantined files if infected </Info>  
   <Protocol> tcp </Protocol>  
   <DstAddr ovf:id=”rescue” />  
   <DstPort> 3306 </DstPort>  
   <SrcAddr ovf:id=” rescue” />  
   <SrcPort> any </SrcPort>  
 </Rule>  
  
 <Origin>  
   <Info> Firewall protection for all VMs </Info>  
   <DateAdded> 2013-01-18 </DateAdded>  
   <AddedBy name=”Administrator” role=”creator”</>  
 </Origin>  
  
</Rescue> 
Encryption 
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framework introduced fine-grained perimeter defense. 
The layer description is as follows.  
 The first layer of defense is Access Control and 
firewall to allow restricted members to access.  
 The second layer consists of the IDS and IPS. The 
aim is to detect attack, intrusion and penetration, 
and also provide up-to-date technologies to pre-
vent attacks such as DoS, anti-spoofing, port scan-
ning, known vulnerabilities, pattern-based attacks, 
parameter tampering, cross site scripting, SQL in-
jection and cookie poisoning. The identity man-
agement is enforced to ensure that right level of ac-
cess is only granted to the right person.  
 The third layer, being an innovative approach, En-
cryption, enforces top down policy based security 
management; integrity management. This feature 
monitors and provides early warning as soon as 
the behavior of the multi-layered entity starts to 
behave abnormally; and end-to-end continuous as-
surance which includes the investigation and re-
mediation after an abnormality is detected. 
Although Yu et al. [13] have illustrated a similar ex-
ample, their proposal is focused on theoretical concepts 
rather than services on offer and implementation. They 
focus on access control and do not have a comprehensive 
approach in providing multi-layered security. The details 
in each layer of security are presented as follows.  
3.3 Layer 1: Firewall 
This section describes the intrusion protection used in 
CCAF to ensure that all data is safeguarded all the times. 
The Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is used with the 
core syntax includes: 
 
crypto key pubkey-chain rsa 
named-key realm-cisco.pub signature 
key-string 
 
While typing these three lines, an encrypted key-string 
is generated to protect the data from potential malicious 
hack. The key-string may look like this: 
 
B199ABCB D34ED0F9 085FADC1 359C189E F30AF10A C0EFB624 
7E0764BF 3E53053E 
Once the key generation is done, the IPS configuration 
can be saved. Similar to “Rescue” XML tag in Section 3.1, 
the next step is to create a rule for IPS, followed by con-
figuring IPS signature storage location. The final step in-
cludes IPS event notification. Their respective steps are 
presented as follows. 
 
ip ips name <rule name> < optional ACL> 
router#configure terminal 
router(config)# ip ips name iosips 
 
ip ips config location flash:<directory name> 
router(config)#ip ips config location flash:ips 
 
ip ips notify sdee 
router(config)#ip ips notify sdee 
 
3.4 Layer 2: Identity Management  
The identity management is divided into three roles: us-
ers, CCAF server and the security manager as follows. 
 
Users 
Users can encrypt each key from his block and his own 
key. They can split files into blocks, encrypt them with 
the key, followed by signing the resulting encrypted 
blocks and creating the storage request. For each file, this 
key will be used to decrypt and rebuild the original file 
during the retrieval phase. The user also uses single sign-
on to access each block with a compact signature scheme. 
 
CCAF Server  
Three roles are offered by the server. First, it can authen-
ticate users during the storage/retrieval phase. Second, it 
can access control. Third, it can encrypt/decrypt data 
between users and their cloud. The data can be further 
encrypted to prevent dictionary attacks before being for-
warded to the metadata manager (MM). Blocks are de-
crypted and the server verifies the signature of each block 
with the user’s public key during the retrieval phase.  
 
Security Manager (SM)  
Security Manager (SM) stores metadata which include 
block signatures, encrypted keys and process identity 
management check. While SM checks and verifies the 
right identity, the CCAF security proceeds to convergent 
encryption, which serves as the third layer of security. SM 
has a link list and a small database, where the link list is 
as follows. 
– Each node in the linked list represents a data block. The 
identifier of each node is obtained by hashing the en-
crypted data block received from the server. 
–A link between two nodes, for example, nodes A and B, 
corresponds to the file identifier and the encryption of the 
key to decrypt the data block B. 
SM can check whether a user is authorized to retrieve a 
file that he/she has requested. This offers an additional 
access control. Additionally, SM can communicate with 
the cloud service provider (SP) to store and retrieve data 
blocks. 
3.5 Layer 3: Convergent Encryption 
After the identity management phase, all data has to un-
dergo the security test offered by Convergent encryption 
(CoE), which uses the hash of plaintext to work out the 
encryption key (K). Here is a sample example to illustrate 
how it works. Adam obtains the encryption key from his 
message M such that K = H(M), where H is a crypto-
graphic hash function; he uses this key to encrypt his 
message, hence: CoE = E(K, M)= E(H(M);M), where E is a 
block cipher. By applying this technique, two different 
users with two identical plaintexts will obtain two identi-
cal ciphertexts since the encryption key is the same. This 
allows the cloud storage provider to perform efficient 
storage (such as deduplication, which means the same file 
is only stored and archived at one place without duplica-
tion) on such ciphertexts without having any knowledge 
on the original plain-texts.  We then illustrate to encrypt 
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the ciphertexts with other encryption algorithm using the 
same keying material for all input to prevent attacks 
against. The benefit is that the deduplication requirement 
can be compatible with CoE.  
3.6 The core code to deploy security 
This section explains the core code to proceed with multi-
layered security to check the status of the CCAF security 
and introduces the state of 0 and 1. The status 0 means all 
activities and all files are manageable and cannot be fully 
controlled. The analogy is like human bodies: while there 
are also bad/cancerous cells, the percentage is so tiny that 
they are controlled. But until to a certain status trigger the 
body immunity, bad/cancerous cells cannot be con-
trolled. To offset his, our human body triggers the alarm 
for body defense. Similar to our security design, status=1 
means that an alarm is triggered and the remedy action 
begins. The system manager can also manually trigger it 
if the data center is under the threat before the system 
detection turns positive. 
Table 2: The code syntax for CCAF security  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If ‘security’ is equal to 1, which means the CCAF secu-
rity process is kicked off as shown in Table 2. If ‘security’ 
is equal 0, it means the CCAF recognizes there is a low 
risk and threat. The term “status(job)” means that the 
CCAF security is offering real-time protection and actions 
for quarantine. All these CCAF commands enable the 
functioning of multi-layered security. Explanations of 
other parts of the security process are as follows.  
 “trigger(status(job))” is to enable the triggering 
of the contingency action. It is the first step to 
trigger a list of actions for maintaining system 
and data security. 
 “check(status(job)” is to check the status of secu-
rity is 0 or 1. The status 0 is the controlled status 
and status of 1 is the triggered status due to secu-
rity breach or threats. 
 “firewall(status(job))” is to enable firewall on. 
 “identity(status(job))” is to enable identity man-
agement to be active.  
 “encryption(status(job))” is to enable encryption 
on. By default, the first three are on. 
 “quarantine((status(job))” is when the CCAF sys-
tem finds the Trojans or viruses, it begins the iso-
late trojans and viruses and attempt to kill them 
or retain them to be completely isolated.   
 “action((status(job))” is to manually make the 
above commands. 
 “report(status(job))” is to report to the 
system at once after “action((status(job)) ” 
or “quarantine((status(job))” are done.  
3.7 Isolation and quarantine if trojans 
and viruses are detected 
This section describes the actions taken if trojans and vi-
ruses are found. All malicious files and signatures are 
first isolated. The strong isolation and integrity manage-
ment is used to protect user safety while using the CCAF 
security service. Strong isolation is required while detect-
ing vulnerabilities in any of the cloud services, including 
the block of unauthorized IPs and attack points/ports. 
While these malicious files and unauthorized access at-
tempts happen, quarantine is the next step to ensure the 
safety and security. It first backups the data safely and 
then attempts to quarantine infected data. If a quarantine 
action is unsuccessful, the files can be kept under “quar-
antine area”, or chosen to be deleted. In the quarantine 
area, the infected files are locked up until further notice.  
3.8 The integrated solution – checking 
all the files and data on one go 
Descriptions in Section 3 present how to deal with mali-
cious files and unauthorized access in each layer of CCAF 
security. Our CCAF proposal can also illustrate the inte-
grated approach which checks all layers in one go.  This is 
an important step due to the following reasons. First, the 
insider threat is an issue if the leaving employees or 
someone with a good knowledge of the security system 
can find ways to sneak through the security check [25]. 
Second, each layer has its own “gatekeeper” for security. 
There is a possibility that well-written malicious code, 
either disguised as safe files or disguised as part of the 
system files, can impose a security risk if there is no final 
check of the entire system. Third, often the Data Center 
Cloud systems serve hundreds and thousands of users 
and have a large number and volume of data possibly at 
petabytes. The security system needs to check all the sta-
tus of the data and check that whether the real-time secu-
rity can be offered for Data services if that includes 
petabytes of data, and when the data is in use. In other 
words, we need an intelligent way to find out how to 
manage such a huge amount of data has been in used and 
in client-server requests at all times. More details will be 
presented in the following section.  
4 The integrated solution of data 
security simulated by business 
process modeling notation 
(BPMN) 
This section describes the integrated solution of data se-
curity which can be achieved by the simulations offered 
by Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) which 
can simulate the execution time of protecting and secur-
ing petabytes of data in the data center. BPM (Business 
Process Modeling) is a process of identifying a number of 
business processes that will have an impact on stakehold-
ers and to the system. BPMN is a tool-independent graph-
While trigger(status(job)) do  
check(status(job)); //to check the status is 0 or 1 
 if (security == 1)  
   firewall(status(job)); 
   identity(status(job));  
   encryption(status(job)); 
else 
   action((status(job)); 
   quarantine(status(job));   
   report(status(job)); //report the system; do not stop CCAF 
end;  
end; 
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ical process definition language to study performance 
evaluation of the system, clarify requirements specifica-
tion (such as use cases), and is executable. IBM [26] re-
ports on saying BPM allows us to focus on our most criti-
cal business priorities first. This section of the paper is 
devoted to eleven habits for highly successful BPM pro-
grams with emphasis on conducting a complete BPM and 
the team. BPMN allows business process to be modeled 
visually, simulated, optimized for efficiency (time & cost), 
optimized for business KPIs (key performance Indica-
tors), and quantified for KPI measurable parameters such 
as security improvement [27]. KPIs are the key to achiev-
ing business improvement for sustainability and perfor-
mance evaluation. Most of the existing work in this area 
[27-29] has largely focused on performance evaluation of 
core business process only. This work has applied to 
study the performance of cloud data security process. 
Hence, we have developed a number of key cloud securi-
ty process that is critical for cloud data. Figure 2 proposes 
a good principle for the cloud architectural design pro-
cess which is also based on some of the key stakehold-
ers/concepts to consider during architectural design: 
• Clients who are potential cloud customers as 
well as cloud administrators 
• Cloud Providers 
• Cloud Management Team 
• Data Centers/Security Pool 
• Intrusion Rejection Process 
The Client of Cloud Computing contains a computer 
software or/and a computer hardware which dependents 
on cloud computing architecture to support the applica-
tion deliveries, or which designed specifically for cloud 
service deliveries. 
     A Client of Cloud Computing Architecture is an inter-
face of common cloud user through the web browsers or 
thin terminals. Cloud provider is the one who offers the 
Cloud Service Delivery Models to Client through the in-
ternet. According to our proposed system the client just 
sends a request to the cloud then the remaining process is 
taking care of cloud service provider who consists of 
Cloud Management Teams, Data Centers/Security pools 
and the Intrusion Detection Mechanisms. Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 represent the BPMN process of Data Request 
flow from Client to Cloud. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Data Request Business Process Model for Cloud 
Security   
4.1 The steps involved with the 
simulated BPMN process 
In order to understand how the BPMN process works and 
can offer the overall contributions to the integrated solu-
tion, this section presents the steps involved in the simu-
lated BPMN process. Simulating a process allows us to 
study its behavior for external events/triggers in that 
process. Process simulation has been successful in several 
applications from low-end to high-end systems. There-
fore, simulating a BPMN model helps us to study busi-
ness behaviors/performance for various expected and 
unexpected scenarios. The BPMN simulation process con-
sists of a number of cyclic phases (See Figure A in Ap-
pendix). BPMN starts with an actor called Client with a 
small circle notation which sends a message to a process 
(Data Request with rounded square) which task has been 
devoted to take action based the request and therefore 
send a message to the cloud (finishing circle). The second 
phase is to annotate each element in the process and 
thirdly to create tasks, assign simulation variables (differ-
ent types of requests both valid and invalid) to process 
and tasks in that process. Finally, create messages be-
tween elements in the process and run a number of simu-
lations. Figure 4  shows the multi-layered security 
demonstrated by our CCAF solution, which includes the 
use of firewall, identity management and encryption. This 
can be simulated by the BPMN following guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Our multi-layered security solution 
 
Data centers are the essential asset of Cloud Compu-
ting corporations and private cloud deployment, these all 
connect to all applications, storage services and servers. 
The business relies on the cloud data centers supports the 
business values and operations and drive maximum effi-
ciencies. The data centers are playing key roles that need 
to be managed and planned very carefully to meet appli-
cations and the users growing performance require-
ments/demands. The data centers architectures propose 
technologies, practices and products which help data cen-
ters engineers and management team who is responsible 
to answer the business goal requirements. According to 
our CCAF framework, any cloud data access service can 
follow the business process steps described in Figure 4, 
which include our multi-layer security protocol (Enter-
prise Firewall, Identity Management, Encryp-
tion/Decryption, and Cloud data security Process Con-
trols). The Cloud data security Process Controls are fur-
ther refined data security processes as shown in Figure 5, 
which is the BPM model for different states of models for 
data security. The data center’s can use this model to 
study the performances of selected cloud data architec-
ture. This process starts with a data status decision (dia-
mond symbol) passes that data based on that decision to 
any one of the paths of the cloud storage processes (data 
at rest, data in use, and data in change/transition). This in 
turn passed on to a data security pool which is a separate 
lane with dedicated security processes (such as data secu-
rity area and data center update) to study security con-
trols in place before it ends. 
Figure 5 is the BPM model for different states of mod-
els for data security. The data center’s can use this model 
to study the performances of selected cloud data architec-
ture. This process starts with a data status decision (dia-
mond symbol) passes that data based on that decision to 
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any one of the paths of the cloud storage processes (data 
at rest, data in use, and data in change/transition). This in 
turn passed on to a data security pool which is a separate 
lane with dedicated security processes (such as data secu-
rity area and data center update) to study security con-
trols in place before it ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: BPMN model for three types of cloud data security 
 
Intrusion Detection: The intrusion detection section is 
used to intimate the cloud management team, data cen-
ters and also its security pools about the intrusions by 
raising the alarms.  The dangers which will happen by the 
intrusions are scalable (in the scale of 1-5; 1 is an ignora-
ble danger and 5 is the most danger). In this business pro-
cess and by the orders of the management team the rejec-
tion and warning messages/e-mails will be composed to 
send the client. The Figure 5 shows the BPMN model for 
simulation of Intrusion Detection/Rejection Process 
which can be used to study the performances of the pro-
posed cloud architectural design.  
The use of BPMN can simulate the daily operations in 
the data centers, which contain up to 10 petabytes (PB) of 
data. Figure 5 also shows the BPMN model for different 
states of models for data security. The data center can use 
this model to study the performances of selected cloud 
data architecture. This process starts with a data status 
decision (diamond symbol) passes that data based on that 
decision to any one of the paths of the cloud storage pro-
cesses (data at rest, data in use, and data in 
change/transition). This in turn passed on to a data secu-
rity pool which is a separate lane with dedicated security 
processes (such as data security area and data center up-
date) to study security controls in place before it ends. 
The process starts with a possible intrusion event (this 
could be an unauthorized access to a data) which triggers 
Raise Alarm process to compose email/message to the 
cloud data administrator immediately noted as the client 
process in this model. See Figure B in the Appendix. The 
following section discusses performance analysis for each 
of those BPM simulations. 
4.2 BPMN Simulation for petabyte data 
security 
This section presents Cloud big data security that is as-
sociated with the integrated solution. As explained in 
Section 2.3, data security for petabytes of data is a priori-
ty. In this section, we present a BPMN simulations of a 
Data Center, which is our data center based at the Uni-
versity of London Computing Center (ULCC). In our pre-
vious paper, we demonstrate that the use of Cloud bioin-
formatics and storage services provide added values and 
positive impacts, and the data center of all these services 
are located at ULCC [18-19]. Since Cloud security is the 
key to business sustainability [1-2, 6, 8], we should struc-
ture security strategy and operation to ensure all services 
can be delivered and optimized. This explains the im-
portance of undertaking BPMN simulations, so that we 
know the execution time required if the entire data at the 
ULCC is at rest, or is in full use, or is involved in the 
transfer of data across different networks (in motion), as 
presented in Figure 5. In the implementation to result 
phase, we use BPMN for protecting the data against vul-
nerabilities and raising alarm in data security while all 10 
PB of data in the Cloud has been intensively in used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Data security Area Peak Access- High execu-
tion time when data in use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Raises Alarm 
 
Figure 6 shows a graph with execution time when the 
BPMN process raised a security alarm. The execution 
time rose from 0 to three peaks (51, 36 and 30 hours) be-
tween July 27 and right before July 30, before falling to 10 
hours of execution time right after July 30, 2013. The in-
crement in execution time was necessary since BPMN 
alarm checked every single file and instance in 10 PB of 
data in the Cloud. This explained why such a long execu-
tion time was required. We plan to develop algorithms or 
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methods that can optimize the security performance. The 
execution time to run each BPMN process only takes 2 
seconds all the times, which has a very low execution 
time. This ensures that fast and efficient BPMB process 
can meet the requirement of business agility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Rejection Message 
 
Figure 7 shows a graph with peak execution time for 
entering the data security area of the business process. 
Results show that increased steadily from 0 to 60 hours 
between July 22 and the middle of July 24, 2013. The exe-
cution time stayed stable at 60 hours between the middle 
of July 24 and beginning of July 27. Some execution time 
increased due to the increasing demands in security. The 
implications of this result show that data security instanc-
es execution time can be high when data was constantly 
in use. On the other hand, the execution time was less 
than 2 hours if data was not in use. Figure 8 shows a per-
formance graph for a rejection message service with peak 
execution times when a BPM process has sent a rejection 
message to allow access to data in privacy. To protect 10 
PB data, it can take up to 125 hours. 
For protecting cloud data, we need to distinguish dif-
ferent states of transitions that can occur in the cloud. 
This will allow us to employ appropriate data security 
techniques. An example model for different classes/states 
for cloud data is shown in Figure 5 and Figure 9. Our no-
tion of cloud data security concept is to “Divide cloud 
data transactions into a few possible ways”: 
• Data at Rest means cloud storage servers and all 
types of storage on the cloud. 
• Data in Change includes all types of data crea-
tion and modification processes, from file crea-
tion/deletion of folders. 
4.3 Performances Evaluation and 
analysis of results 
Section 4.2 presents BPMN simulations when all the data 
are in full use and capacity while they have either en-
countered security breach or have raised security alarm. 
The execution time between Figure 6 and Figure 8 repre-
sent the amount of time for the data to be fully protected 
or recovered after the security incident.  
They do not represent the execution time of perform-
ing such BPMN simulations. This section presents the 
results of performing BPMN simulations in each instance. 
There are eight instances altogether and each time execu-
tion time was taken five times to average out, with the 
standard deviation of 3% of all time taken. All execution 
time to complete BPMN simulations for Figures 9-11 need 
between 1.92 and 2 seconds as shown in Figure 9. Results 
show that BPMN simulations support high-performance 
in Cloud Computing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Execution time to perform BPMN simulations 
for Figures 9-11 
 
     Apart from supporting high-performance feature in 
Cloud Computing discussed in the earlier part of this 
section, this paper has introduced CCAF multi-layered 
security including their components and technical details. 
This ensures our work has made theory into practice and 
use multi-layered security to illustrate how to transform 
the conceptual framework into a real-life deployment 
used in Cloud security. Similarly, the use of BPMN is 
used to simulate the full data security of the Data Center. 
Results presented in Section 4.2 show that it takes be-
tween 50 and 125 hours for protecting data and raise 
alarm in real-time when data is in use. There is a gap time 
between 50 and 125 hours which leaves vulnerabilities to 
the data center with 10 petabytes of data in place. The use 
of CCAF multi-layered security provides additional pro-
tection to the data and ensures that all data can be safe-
guarded before the all 10 petabytes are fully optimized 
for services. We propose that the CCAF multi-layered 
security is the solution to this situation. In order to 
demonstrate the advantages of adopting CCAF multi-
layered security, we have undertaken penetration tests to 
see how many viruses and trojans are trapped or cleaned, 
and the percentage of successful blocked rate. 
5 The experiments of 
penetration testing for 
ethical hacking 
To demonstrate whether the ULCC can withstand the 
rapid data growth due to the viruses and trojans, ethical 
hacking is an appropriate way to test the system perfor-
mance [30-31]. Ethical hacking includes ways to penetrate 
into the security system in the awareness of the host. The 
environment for the ethical hacking was as follows. One 
hundred of virtual machines (VMs) were set up and each 
one had the CCAF multi-layered security turning on. An 
ethical hacking firm (which did not want its name re-
vealed) took part in this test and provided 10,000 known 
viruses and trojans detected between 2010 and 2012 in the 
internet security breach and each of these viruses/trojans 
had their fix patches or repairs by the most-up-to-date 
security company. The objective is to test how many vi-
ruses and trojans that CCAF multi-layered security can 
block and quarantine. Another one hundred VMs have 
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the Mcafee antivirus (a work partner) turning on to test 
the performance. This section presents the penetration 
testing and outcomes of the test to support that the multi-
layered security can perform better for, filter out mali-
cious attacks. To do this test, 10,000 known trojans and 
viruses are injected into the CCAF multi-layered security 
with the following numbers recorded: 
• The number of viruses and trojans detected and 
blocked by each layer.  
• The total numbers of viruses and trojans detected 
and blocked the system. 
• The number of viruses and trojans detected but 
unable to be blocked and sent to quarantine.  
• In the quarantine, the number of viruses and tro-
jans that can be destroyed.  
• In the quarantine, the number of viruses and tro-
jans that cannot be destroyed.  
    Two types of experiments were undertaken. The first 
one was focused on penetration tests involved with inject-
ing 10,000 viruses and trojans in one go. The second one 
was focused on continuous penetration test, such as in-
jecting 10,000 same viruses and trojans every five hours to 
test that the entire data center is under the security threat 
as presented by BPMN simulations in Section 4.  
5.1 Results of penetration tests 
Figure 10 shows the results of penetration tests. 5,423 vi-
ruses and Trojans have been detected and blocked by the 
firewall. Another 3,742 viruses and trojans have been de-
tected and blocked by identity management and intrusion 
prevention systems. 842 trojans and viruses are then de-
tected and blocked by the encryption. All the blocked 
viruses and trojans can be destroyed in seconds. Amongst 
all these figures, there are remaining 81 viruses and tro-
jans sent to quarantine when they cannot be destroyed 
directly. 79 of them can be destroyed by the quarantine. 
The remaining 2 viruses and trojans are unable to be de-
stroyed but can be isolated independently. In other 
words, 10,000 trojans and viruses do not damage any of 
10 petabytes of data in the ULCC Data Center. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Results of penetration tests 
 
Three different penetration testing metrics have been pre-
sented. First, the efficiency of penetration testing is meas-
ured based on a number of key penetration testing met-
rics as follows: 
Penetration Test Efficiency (PTe, %) = (No. of Vi-
rus detected & blocked (V) + No. of Trojans de-
tected & blocked (T)/Total Numbers detected & 
blocked (N) ) x 100% 
 
         𝑃𝑇𝑒 = (∑ 𝑉 + ∑ 𝑇𝑁1
𝑁
1 /N) x 100%        (1) 
 
Second, Security Test Efficiency (STe, %) = (Number 
of Surface Attacks Detected, Blocked & Killed 
(SAs)/Total Number of Systems Surfaces Interfaces 
(SIs))*100% 
 
𝑆𝑇𝑒 = (∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑁0 /∑ 𝑆𝐼𝑠
𝑁
0  ) x 100%            (2) 
 
Third, Business Process Efficiency (BPMNe, %) = 
(PTe*Total Number of BPMN Process/Total No. of 
Penetration Test Hours)*100% 
 
                    𝐵𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑒 = (𝑃𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐵𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑡/𝑋) x 100%    (3) 
 
Based on formula (1) to (2), the total number of viruses 
and trojans is 1,000 and the total number of detect and 
block is 9,919, total number of detect, block and kill is 
9,998, hence  
PTe = (9919/10000) x 100% = 99.19% 
 STe = (9998 / 10000) x 100% = 99.98%   
5.2 Results of continuous penetration 
tests 
Results are presented in percentages rather than the 
number of viruses and trojans blocked. 10,000 same vi-
ruses and trojans are injected every five hours to test how 
the Data Center can cope with the vulnerabilities in the 
most crucial 125 hours.  
Results in Figure 11 show the percentage that viruses and 
trojans that have been blocked, which dropped from 
99.19% to 76.00% in 125 hours. However, we also defend 
that the percentage of quarantine action is important to 
protect petabytes of data. If the percentage of quarantine 
is high, the data security can be maintained. In every 5 
hours, the percentage of quarantine was measured. It 
started as high as 97.53% and then remains fairly constant 
(within 2.4% standard deviations) throughout the period 
of 125 hours. These results support our statements that 
CCAF multi-layered security can protect data security. 
Experiments conducted in Section 4.1 and the penetration 
testing took 125 hours each. The percentage of blocking 
has dropped to 76.00% at the end of 125 hours, in this case  
BPMNe=(76.00% x 125 / 125) = 76.00%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: The percentage that viruses and trojans that 
have been blocked     
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5.3 Comparison with other approaches 
This section describes comparison between our and other 
approaches. There are theoretical-based proposals by 
Goyal et al [32], Yu et al. [13], Wang et al [14] and Zissis 
and Lekkas [33] have addressed similar approaches with 
their rationale and theories in place without performing 
large scale experiments to check the robustness of their 
models. We compared CCAF multi-layered security with 
a single-layered approach by performing experiments. As 
mentioned in Section 5.1, Mcafee antivirus was used to 
compare performance with our CCAF multi-layered secu-
rity. Mcafee service was similar to the intrusion detection 
system (IDS) and intrusion prevention system (IPS).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: CCAF multi-layered security versus single-
layered security (eg one Mcafee product)  
 
10,000 viruses and trojans provided by the ethical 
hacking company was used and results such as the num-
ber of viruses and trojans killed or isolated were record-
ed. Figure 12 shows the number of viruses and trojans 
killed or blocked, where the CCAF multi-layered could 
kill/block 9,917 and the single-layered Mcafee could 
kill/block 7,438. We then reproduced the same experi-
ment shown in Figure 12 to compare two approaches.  
The results in Figure 13 showed that the CCAF multi-
layered security has an average of 20% performance bet-
ter than the adoption of a single-layered security (such as 
Mcafee) throughout the 125 hours of experiments. Results 
in our empirical studies confirm that the multi-layered 
approach can provide a better security service for the data 
center, particularly when the data security is a primary 
concern for the Cloud adopters and users. However, only 
one Mcafee product was used for comparison due to the 
licensing issue although multiple Mcafee products could 
serve like what CCAF multi-layered security could offer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of blocking viruses and trojans for 
CCAF multi-layered versus single-layered security 
5.4 Metrics, Analysis and comparison 
This section presents the metrics and its analysis and 
comparison with other methods based on our experi-
mental results particularly penetration testing. Antunes 
and Vieira [34] use four types of tools for penetration test-
ing, explain the use of precision, recall and F-measure to 
justify the validity of their results. Amongst all the four 
tools for penetration testing, all results were very low. 
Although their third tool had a precision of 1, its recall 
and F-measure values are 0.019 and 0.037, which are ex-
tremely low. The metrics is based on our penetration test-
ing results and transform them into precision, recall and 
F-measure. Their definitions are as follows. Precision is 
the ratio of correctly detected vulnerabilities to the num-
ber of all detected vulnerabilities: 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
Recall is the ratio of true vulnerabilities detected to the 
number of known vulnerabilities: 
 
 
 (5) 
where: 
 True positive (tp) refer to the number of true 
vulnerabilities detected; 
 False positives (fp) refer to the number of vulner-
abilities detected but do not exist. 
 True vulnerabilities (tv) refer to the total number 
of vulnerabilities detected in penetration tests. 
F-measure can be presented in terms of precision and 
recall as follows. 
 
       F-measure 
 
 
(6) 
Services that can generate a high F-measure mean they 
are better services [34]. If a service obtains a precision of 
0.8 means it can detect vulnerability with 80%. A recall of 
0.9 means 90% of the known vulnerabilities is detected. 
While using formula (3), F-measure is equal to 0.8471. The 
combination of precision, recall and F-measure can de-
termine the quality of the security services. We reproduce 
the experiments conducted by [34] and then compare re-
sults of CCAF multi-layered security with VS1, VS2, VS3 
and VS 4 tools due to similarities with CCAF technologies 
except each is single layered security.  
Table 3: comparison between CCAF and other single-
layered services 
Services Precision Recall F-Measure 
CCAF 1 0.9919 0.996 
VS1 0.455 0.323 0.378 
VS2 0.388 0.241 0.297 
VS3 1 0.019 0.037 
VS4 0.567 0.241 0.338 
 
Results in Table 3 show that the CCAF multi-layered 
security can provide a much better service since all the 
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true vulnerabilities can be detected with precision as 1. 
Since only 5 out of 10,000 are missed, the recall is 0.995, 
resulting in F-measure as 0.9975, which are above all the 
test results.  
5.5 How to use CCAF for organizations 
CCAF can be used on each VM and each server to 
check all the incoming data to see whether they are clean, 
quarantine and free of suspected malicious files. Suspect-
ed files will be alerted and moved to the quarantine sec-
tion ready for further checks. Since experiments have 
been conducted over 125 hours with 99.19% PTe, 99.98% 
STe, 100% precision, 99.19% recall and 99.5% F-measure, 
there is a good reliability. The use of CCAF mutli-layered 
security can ensure the high level of protection and safe-
guard of data security for the organizations.   
5.6 Relevance to Big Data 
Our paper demonstrates data security using CCAF multi-
layered security to illustrate our proofs-of-concepts. There 
are five characteristics with Big Data: volume, velocity, 
variety, veracity and value. Our work meets volume, 
since extensive experiments and simulations had been 
performed for 10 petabytes of data. Our work also meets 
velocity, since 10,000 viruses and trojans had been inject-
ed into our multi-layered security to test how our pro-
posed solution can handle a large amount of infected 
files. The finding was that up to 125 hours were required 
to gain control and full data recovery. Experimental re-
sults in Section 5 also support veracity, since more than 
99% of viruses and trojans can be blocked and removed 
under the ethical penetration test.  
6 Conclusion and Future Work 
   Our paper has demonstrated the CCAF multi-layered 
security for the data security in the Data Center under the 
proposal and recommendation of CCAF guidelines. We 
explained the rationale, overview, components in the 
CCAF, where the design was based on the requirements 
and the implementation was illustrated by its multi-
layered security. We explained how multi-layered securi-
ty was a suitable method and recommendation, since it 
offered multiple protection and improvement of security 
for 10 PB of data in the Data Center based at the Universi-
ty of London Computing Center (ULCC). We explained 
the technical details in each layer of security and propose 
an integrated solution to check all the data when data is 
intensively used. We used the Business Process Modeling 
Notation (BPMN) to simulate the cases of how the data 
can be used, either at rest, in use, or in motion. All simu-
lations could be completed within 2 seconds.  
Our BPMN simulation results showed that it could 
take up to 50 hours to protect all the 2PB data and up to 
125 hours to raise an alarm to take control of the situation 
in the ULCC Data Center. This means that an integrated 
approach was required to ensure data protection, in case 
that the data center is under the attack or potential threat 
from the rapid rise of data growth in the data center, 
which can be due to the external intrusion or the internal 
rapid consumption. We then used FGSM for the penetra-
tion testing. 10,000 viruses and trojans were injected into 
Data Center with two experiments performed. The first 
experiment showed that firewall, identity management 
and encryption could block 5,423, 3,742 and 842 viruses 
and trojans respectively. The remaining 81 could be either 
quarantined or isolated. The second experiment showed 
that continuous injection of 10,000 viruses and trojans 
could make the blocking rate decreased from the 99.19% 
to 76.00% in 125 hours. Despite of this result, the CCAF 
multi-layered security could quarantine and isolate 
97.53% of viruses and trojans. Our work can demonstrate 
that the use of CCAF multi-layered security can protect 
the data center from the rapid data growth due to the 
security breach, and the use of BPMN can calculate how 
much time required for rescue action if the data security 
is compromised. In this way, we can work out the better 
tactics and plans for data recovery and security. 
In this paper, we demonstrated that CCAF multi-
layered security could provide the additional protection 
for all 10 PB of data in 125 hours when the Data Center 
was under the security threat and attack. Data security in 
the Cloud is an important issue for Cloud adoption. We 
demonstrated that our approach could provide real-time 
protection of all the data, block the majority of threats and 
quarantine the petabyte systems in the Data Center. We 
plan to improve our method and code in the simulation 
and choose the right type of algorithms to improve the 
overall performance in execution time of data security 
and blocking viruses/trojans in real-time. We will devel-
op more services and proofs-of-concept in CCAF to im-
prove the performance of BPMN simulation and penetra-
tion testing. Existing studies on cloud security [11, 14, 20-
24; 28-29, 33] have been focused on either identify man-
agement, general issues concerning cloud security, access 
control or architecture layers. Our approach provides an 
integrated solution to cloud security based on a clear 
framework, business process modeling to study the im-
pact on the performance of a user accessed service which 
is often learned on the fly which is costly and a CCAF 
three layered model. 
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